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Walter Kaufmann, Discovering the Mind: Goethe, Kant, and Hegel.
New York: McGraw-Hill Co., 1980. 288 pp. $14. 95.
Review by Edward Bordeau

Discovering the Mind is the first volume of a trilogy. Since
Walter Kaufmann died in September of last year, the publication of
the remaining two volumes is in question. Although some allusions
are made to men and ideas to be treated in the subsequent volumes,
this highly engaging inquiry into the different directions Goethe,
Kant, and Hegel each travelled on the road to "discovering the mind"
is executed with such clarity, singleness of purpose, and erudition as
to be self-contained. In addition to Goethe, Kant, and Hegel, the
projected trilogy was to include Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Buber
(Volume II), and Freud, Adler, and Jung (Volume III).
Kaufmann does nothing to hide his feelings for the three
German thinkers he is assessing; on the contrary, he is convinced that
only by honestly confronting these emotions do we discover
something about our own minds. Obscure writing reflects an
author's fear of knowing something about himself and this in part
explains both Kant's and Hegel's inability to express their philosophies
clearly. In a style at once crisp and brusque, Kaufmann wastes no
words to reveal his enormous dislike for Kant and to express his
equally enormous admiration for Goethe, and in part for Hegel.
But honesty is only a part of the explanation for Kaufmann's
aggressive style. He tells us he loves philosophy and would like to see
the mainstream take a new direction. Contemporary philosophers in
phenomenology, existentialism, and analytic philosophy continue to
imitate the philosophical style of Kant, which Kaufmann considers a
"disaster." His contribution to this redirection of philosophy is to
help destroy the myth that Kant was a rigorous, scientific thinker and
to demonstrate that not only has Kant contributed little or nothing to
the discovery of the mind but has actually impeded such a discovery
by developing a misguided transcendental method in preference to
history and psychology.
Nonetheless, Kaufmann's feelings towards Kant are ambivalent.
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On several occasions he refers to Kant as "one of the greatest
philosophers of all time," in the same league with Plato and Aristotle.
But he fails to tell us why or how Kant earns this high esteem. At one
point Kaufmann mentions Kant's "comprehensive vision," which,
however, he has already labeled a "disaster." He tells us that if he had
to divide philosophers into the "good guys"and the "bad guys," Kant
would certainly be placed among the "good guys." Why? It seems
that despite the fact that Kant was unable to face it, he was a "daring"
philosopher who helped to topple the rationahstc cosmology,
theology, and psychology of his day. Kant's great failure lay in his
inability to offer his convictions as hypotheses, mere suggestions, or
educated guesses; rather, he made a pretense of scientific rigor,
completeness, and finality, and succeeded in convincing most of his
readers, as well as himself, that he had actually done so.
Kaufmann accentuates Kant's failures as a thinker by contrasting
him with Goethe, who, according to him, made the greatest
contributions to the discovery of the mind. He quotes Nietzsche, who
identified Kant as "the antipode of Goethe" in Twilight of the Idols
(1889). Whereas Kant was a conceptual thinker, at home with
abstractions and words, Goethe was a "visual" thinker, steeped in life
experience, and who expressed his thoughts with a charming
lucidity.
The first and second sections of the book treat of Goethe's and
Kant's contributions to the discovery of the mind, and their findings
can be organized under four points. First, the question of human
freedom and autonomy greatly interested both German thinkers, but
their views are diametrically opposed. Wishing to stave off the
determinism implied by a Newtonian world view, Kant held that we
are free when our choices are determined, not by our inclinations or
interests, but by our duty to obey moral laws because they are
rational and hold for everyone. Kaufmann ironically interprets the
Categorical Imperative to mean we are free only when we don't have
"a will of our own." Goethe, on the other hand, takes "autonomy" to
mean "independence," an Emersonian independence that translates
into self-reliance and nonconformity; in contradistinction to Kant, it
means having "a will of your own." Kaufmann regards Kantian
ethics, as well as Kantian aesthetics, as reflections, not of the human
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mind, but of Kant's peculiar mind with all its eccentricities.
Secondly, according to Kaufmann, Kant was woefully out of
touch with the realities of human life and experience; his personal life
was extremely parochial and uncommon. A cerebral man of
uncompromising routine, Kant was comfortable with conceptions
and words, ever given to making unhelpful coinages; he totally
lacked an aesthetic sense. And he made the fatal mistake of making
his mind the model of the human mind, of uncritically universalizing
the peculiarities of his upbringing and environment. By contrast,
Goethe was a deeply experiential man with great artistic sensitivity.
He identified man with his deeds and actions; thus, he rejected the
belief that man has a static essence or an inner self or soul having a
timeless structure.
Thirdly, as Kaufmann interprets Kant, he believed that the
human mind was a static entity, furnished with an unchanging set of
categories and faculties, fixed for all time. But Goethe, as we have
shown, was ever sensitive to the variant flux of becoming, to the
dynamic, and understood the human mind as a process of development
that could be grasped only in its movements.
Finally, even more important is Goethe's refusal to support the
method of Newtonian science as the paradigm of knowledge as Kant
and others had done. Prejudiced against hypotheses and probability,
the Newtonian model of science continued the classical bias in favor
of the certainty and necessity of mathematics. Kant looked upon the
concepts of Newtonian physics and Euclidean geometry as revelations
of the immutable structure of the human mind itself.
In staking out within the mind of man this immutable terrain,
Kant secured for man a remnant of the transcendent and thus saved
him from being engulfed by the phenomenal. In Whitehead's words,
Kant provided man with "a refuge from the goading urgency of
contingent happenings." Not unlike Plato, Kant sought to escape
from contingency and change, developing a philosophy of universal
and necessary laws in science and morals. Even in his personal life
chance was allowed no entry; his daily activities were strictly
regulated by a scrupulously administered schedule that extended to
the quantity of tobacco he could smoke and the number of pills he
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could take for his constipation.
But Kant's static view of man became increasingly uncongenial
to an age of revolution and a period committed to progress. George
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) was a product of the Enlightenment and had been inspired, initially at least, by the "noble ideals" of
the French Revolution. The last segment of the book deals with
Hegel who, of course, inherited, as a legacy of the German Idealistic
movement that was spawned by Kant's works, the idea of a
philosophical science with the spurious rigor of mathematics. But
Hegel had also been significantly influenced by Goethe, from whom
he acquired the conviction that "the history of science is science
itself." Hegel's Phenomenology of the Mind (1807) supports inconsistent interpretations of the meaning of "phenomenology." On
the one hand, it embodies the Goethean program of trying to catch
the meaning of the mind in its development, in the process of its own
becoming. On the other hand, the work is presented as a preparation
for raising consciousness to the level of absolute knowledge; we are
allegedly led, by a logical progression, from stage to stage wherein
the transitions are "necessary." But all of this is pretense of scientific
rigor, in imitation of the founder of the tradition, Kant. According to
Kaufmann, the movements are arbitrary or rather dictated by
aesthetic preference. However, despite his Kantian method Hegel
does advance the discovery of the mind by the centrality of the
Goethean themes in the Phenomenology, themes that continued to
operate even in those students of his thought who turned against him,
such as Marx, Kierkegaard, and Dewey.
It seems to me that Discovering the Mind contributes to a
redirection of philosophy already dramatically advanced by the
American pragmatists of the last century, especially by Charles S.
Peirce and William James. Peirce's emphasis on the "experimental
method" and the tentative and fallible nature of both scientific and
philosophical truth and James's redefinition of the mind as a "stream
of consciousness" in his epoch making Principles of Psychology
(1890) reflect the impact of Darwinism on post-Kantian philosophy,
an impact from which Kantianism never recovered. The evolutionary
hypothesis, as applied to science itself and to the nature of the mind,
could not but make us view both as processes that can be understood
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only in their respective movements or histories, a view expressed
somewhat statically by Hegel. It was Goethe's genius to have already
grasped this truth intuitively, even before Darwin gave it scientific
respectability.
But it was, as Whitehead called him, that "adorable" James who
first formalized the realization that at bottom philosophic sides are
taken by aesthetic preferences; whether one is at home with novelty
and experimentation, as was Goethe, or whether one is more
comfortable with the fixed and immutable, as was Kant, is ultimately
decided by temperament, according to James. Psychology has much
to do with our philosophies and cannot be excluded from them
without doing violence to our experience and our own selfunderstanding.
After World War II, Walter Kaufmann's reinterpretation of
Hegel, together with the neo-Marxist movement, did much to
stimulate a renewed interest in Hegel studies. The redirection of
philosophy which he hoped to influence with his critique of Kant and
others in his projected trilogy involves two major reconstructions:
one in philosophical method and the other in a reformulation of the
nature of the human mind.

Peter Farb and George Armelagos, Consuming Passions: The
Anthropology of Eating. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1980. 279 pp.
$12.95.
Review by Deborah K. DeCorso
Eating, as everyone knows, is a biological necessity. It can also
be a pleasant social event, a setting for the transaction of business, a
religious ritual, a compulsion. Consuming Passions: The Anthropology
of Eating is a survey of human eating habits, past and present, which
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